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Abstract 
European banks are exposed to a substantial amount of risky sovereign debt. The “missing 
bank capital” resulting from the zero-risk weight exemption for European banks for 
European sovereign debt amplifies the co-movement between sovereign CDS spreads and 
facilitates cross-border financial-crisis spillovers. Risks spill over from risky periphery 
sovereigns to safer core countries, but not in the opposite direction nor for exposures to 
countries not exempted from risk-weighting. We consider the trade-off of benefits of 
sovereign debt (for banks and sovereigns) and spillover risk when applying risk-weights. 
More bank capital as well as positive risk-weighting for sovereign exposures mitigates 
spillovers.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The European financial system is highly integrated because banks are among the 
largest holders of sovereign debt; on average, 70% of the government debt of each country 
was held by foreign investors at the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis at the end of 
2009. While financial integration has benefits such as access to liquidity or diversification 
of bank portfolios (Holmström and Tirole, 1997), it might give rise to contagion as risks 
can spill over more easily from riskier to safer countries that could even outweigh the ex-
ante benefits (Bolton and Jeanne, 2011). In this paper, we focus on potential costs of 
financial integration and investigate channels how financial crises can spill over between 
countries.1  
Importantly and central to our paper is that European banks are not required to fund 
even risky sovereign debt holdings of any European Union (EU) member state with equity. 
According to EU legislation, namely the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), European 
banks are allowed to use a “zero risk weight” for EU sovereign debt. Moreover, financial 
regulators in the EU removed the concentration limits for sovereign debt exposures.2 EU 
banks could thus accumulate excessive leverage by investing in risky sovereign debt (such 
as from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal or Spain (henceforth, GIIPS)).3 
If sovereign risk increases (as we have observed during the European sovereign 
debt crisis since 2010), banks find themselves severely under-capitalized because they 
have not accumulated a capital buffer for their sovereign debt exposure. Sovereigns 
                                                 
1 We discuss possible benefits and costs of financial integration in detail in the last section of this paper. 
2 For comparison, European banks are only allowed to have exposure to single name corporate debt if that 
exposure does not exceed 25% of Tier 1 capital. 
3 Several recent papers have investigated why banks invest in sovereign debt and highlighted different 
motives such as search for yield and risk-shifting incentives (Acharya and Steffen, 2015; Crosignani, 2017), 
or moral suasion (De Marco and Macchiavelli, 2016; Ongena et al., 2016). Gennaioli et al. (2016) 
investigates banks’ sovereign bond exposures in developed and less-developed countries.  
 3 
arguably extend an (implicit) guarantee to provide capital backstops for their domestic 
banking sector. Sovereign risk, as measured, for example, using credit default swap (CDS) 
spreads, should therefore reflect a country’s expected bailout costs for its financial sector 
when Eurozone sovereign risk increases. Zero risk weights thus provide a channel through 
which sovereign risk can spread among EU member states. 4 
We take banks’ choice to hold a diversified portfolio of sovereign bonds as given 
and show that sovereign CDS spreads exhibit a larger co-movement with other European 
sovereign CDS spreads if domestic banks have large foreign sovereign bond exposures 
that they do not fund with capital because of zero risk weights. While the two important 
papers by Acharya et al. (2014a) and Gennaioli et al. (2014) analyze sovereign-bank 
feedback loops in crisis countries such as Ireland and Greece, we show that a sovereign-
bank loop might develop even in the banking sectors of safer countries because of 
exposure to non-domestic sovereign debt and increase the risk and funding costs of 
sovereigns because of zero risk weights. This is the central result of our paper. 
Our empirical analysis is motivated by a recent theoretical model in Bolton and 
Jeanne (2011) who analyze international spillovers between financially integrated 
economies. They show that financial integration allows banks to diversify their portfolios 
by holding sovereign debt from different countries because riskier countries do not 
internalize the costs of other member countries associated with higher financial fragility. 
Riskier countries can thus eventually extract fiscal concessions either in the form of 
transfers or when safer governments choose to recapitalize their domestic banking sectors. 
We operationalize this idea in the following way. Sovereign CDS spreads should 
                                                 
4 Quintessential examples of sovereign risk spillovers include Cypriot banks and Dexia. Dexia required (a 
second) government support due to its sovereign exposures in 2011, not because the exposures were so big 
but because it had very little equity due to the zero weight exemption (Admati and Hellwig, 2013). 
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reflect their domestic bank sectors’ exposure to risky non-domestic sovereign debt 
resulting in a co-movement of sovereign CDS spreads. We hypothesize that the co-
movement is even more pronounced if domestic banks have large non-domestic sovereign 
bond exposures that are not funded with capital reflecting the implicit expectation that 
governments bail out their domestic banks. 
To investigate this hypothesis, we construct a new measure of “missing capital” in 
the banking sector stemming from the fact that banks hold sovereign debt with high credit 
risk in their portfolios combined with the fact that sovereign risk weights are set to zero. 
We assign risk weights to each sovereign bond based on the sovereign’s credit rating (or, 
alternatively, CDS spread) and compute the corresponding risk-weighted assets for each 
bank’s sovereign bond portfolio. Given that banks are not required to fund these exposures 
with equity, which represents a wealth transfer from taxpayers to banks’ shareholders due 
to implicit bailout assumptions, we call this measure a “sovereign subsidy.”5 
We construct a sovereign CDS market index that is representative of the CDS 
spreads of all non-domestic European countries using the outstanding government debt of 
these countries as weights. We find that sovereign CDS spreads have a stronger co-
movement with the European sovereign CDS index if the domestic banks of the former 
obtain a larger non-domestic sovereign subsidy. This is consistent with the interpretation 
that sovereign risk increases with an increase in the expected bailout costs of its financial 
sector due to a non-domestic sovereign default.  
Bolton and Jeanne (2011) suggest that a sovereign-bank loop can develop in safer 
                                                 
5 We construct this measure for all banks that participated in the stress tests conducted by the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) during the period from March 2010 to June 2012 and document that the total 
sovereign subsidy accumulates to more than €500 billion at each of the stress test dates, or, on average, to 
more than 50% of Tier 1 capital. 
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countries because of financial crisis spillovers. We thus split our sample in riskier GIIPS 
countries and safer non-GIIPS countries and find that non-GIIPS sovereigns exhibit a 
larger co-movement with the sovereign CDS index if banks have large foreign sovereign 
bond exposures not backed by own funds. We find no evidence, however, for spillovers to 
riskier GIIPS countries from their foreign sovereign exposures.  
We also investigate the effect of European sovereign risk on bank sector credit risk 
using bank level exposure data. Sovereign risk differentially affects the risk of GIIPS and 
non-GIIPS banks. Importantly, our results support the view that domestic sovereign-to-
bank linkages are particularly important for GIIPS banks. However, non-domestic 
sovereign risk spills over to safer countries and increases bank risk particularly of those 
banks which have non-domestic sovereign bond exposures not funded with capital. 
We then address concerns with the use of non-zero risk weights that also apply to 
corporate debt. For example, one could argue that sovereigns can raise taxes or that 
government bonds also provide valuable services for governments and banks and 
contribute positively to public debt or liquidity management. Sovereign risk weights 
should thus be lower thereby casting doubt on the zero-risk weight spillover channel.  
We incorporate the trade-off between benefits of sovereign debt and costs 
associated with risk spillovers and construct new risk weights based on a country’s budget 
deficit. I.e., we define a risk weight of zero if the country fulfills the Maastricht criteria 
(i.e. budget deficit equal or smaller than 3% of GDP) and apply the EBA risk weights 
otherwise. In a second test, we also use a lower loss-given-default that is comparable to 
historical haircuts when sovereigns defaulted in emerging markets (Cruces and Trebesch, 
2013). Also, in a third test, we use CDS implied risk weights instead of risk weights based 
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on ratings and we instrument the sovereign exposures in calculating the sovereign subsidy 
and the CDS index at the beginning of the sample period. In all tests, we get very similar 
results. However, when we ignore risk-weighting and use the exposure-at-default when 
constructing the sovereign subsidy, we get a statistically insignificant and economically 
small effect. These results support our view that zero risk weights are a main culprit in 
understanding risk-spillovers from GIIPS to non-GIIPS countries. 
We also investigate several other alternative explanations that are consistent with 
our findings such as common shocks (e.g. the global financial crisis or spillovers between 
countries due to, for example, trade and other economic linkages) that could explain the 
co-movement of sovereign CDS spreads. Moreover, sovereigns might choose to provide 
fiscal transfers and directly bail out risky governments [e.g., through the European 
Stability Mechanism, or ESM]. Finally, it could also be that the co-movement of sovereign 
CDS spreads might be explained by banks’ non-sovereign exposures. Accounting for these 
alternatives, we still find results consistent with the zero risk weight channel.  
In a last step, we investigate the role of bank capital in mitigating sovereign risk 
spillovers. Banks have to use own funds when they invest in sovereign debt that is not 
exempted from regular risk-weighting. We thus run a similar analysis using the exposures 
of our sample banks to Japanese and U.S. sovereign debt and do not find evidence of 
elevated co-movement if banks have larger risk-weighted exposures.  
Further, the EBA conducted a “capitalization exercise” in September 2011 
requiring banks to hold a (temporary) capital buffer to account for the risks associated with 
their sovereign bond portfolios as of June 2012, effectively removing the zero risk weight 
exemption. We find that the effect of sovereign subsidies on sovereign risk spillovers 
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becomes insignificant after the capital requirement comes into effect, again suggesting that 
under-capitalization of the financial sector due to the zero risk weights amplifies sovereign 
risk spillovers in Europe. 
Finally, not all banks make use of the zero-risk weight exemption. The EBA 
released information on banks’ risk-weighted exposures in different asset classes for the 
first time in June 2012. If banks apply the zero risk weight regulation, we expect the risk-
weighted exposures to European sovereign bonds to be zero. We document substantial 
cross-sectional variation in risk-weighted exposures to European sovereign bonds across 
banks and find that the co-movement of sovereign CDS spreads is significantly reduced if 
banks apply higher risk weights and if banks have larger equity-to-asset ratios. 
Related literature. Our paper connects with different strands of literature. First, it is 
related to the growing literature studying sovereign-bank linkages. The two important 
papers by Acharya et al. (2014a) and Gennaioli et al. (2014) mentioned above are closest 
to this study.6 Acharya et al. (2014a) study how sovereign-bank feedback loops develop in 
the banking sector and spill over to the domestic sovereign due bank bailouts (“Irish-style” 
crisis). Gennaioli et al. (2014) show that an increase in sovereign risk affects the domestic 
banking sector due to its holdings of domestic sovereign bonds (“Greek-style” crisis). Both 
papers describe the importance of sovereign-bank linkages in crisis countries because of 
banks’ holdings of domestic sovereign bonds and discuss problems related to “home bias”, 
i.e. chunky sovereign exposures that created the well-known problems in risky countries in 
the periphery. 
                                                 
6 Other papers modeling the sovereign-bank feedback loop include Cooper and Nikolov (2013), Bocola 
(2016) and Farhi and Tirole (2017). In contrast to the two aforementioned papers, Farhi and Tirole (2017) 
study the feedback loop in an open economy and can thus explain also the re-nationalization of sovereign 
debt when a crisis deepens.  
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Our paper investigates how crises can spill over from crisis to safe countries in 
financially integrated economies. This effect stems from banks’ small non-domestic 
sovereign bond positions as they do not fund their exposures with capital because of zero 
risk weights. A sovereign-bank loop can thus develop in the banking sectors of safe 
countries because of exposure to non-domestic sovereign debt that increases the risk and 
funding costs of sovereigns because of implicit bailout assumptions.  
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on international spillovers. Ang and 
Longstaff (2013) and Chen (2013) evaluate the co-movement of sovereign default risk and 
find that financial linkages are likely to provide a channel for sovereign risk spillovers. 
Kallestrup et al. (2016) and Beltratti and Stulz (2015) argue that bank health in safer 
countries can be affected through banks’ cross-border exposures. We show that the source 
of the spillovers during the recent sovereign debt crisis is the “missing capital” due to zero 
risk-weighting of sovereign debt and that spillovers can be mitigated if banks fund these 
exposures with capital, which is new to the literature. 
Third, our paper is related to a literature that studies the implications of risk 
weights in internal bank risk models. Behn at al. (2017) find that banks that use internal 
risk models calculate lower risk weights compared to banks using the standardized 
approach for the same exposures and even increase the risk in their loan portfolio. Acharya 
et al. (2014b) argue that banks become overleveraged as risk weights (e.g. on mortgage 
loans) are too low. We find that the application of zero risk weights due to exemptions in 
the regulatory framework creates a lack of capital in the banking system that facilitates the 
spillover of financial crises among financially integrated countries such as in the European 
Monetary Union. 
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2. Regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures 
The European Commission established common rules on capital requirements for 
credit institutions and investment firms to increase financial stability in the Eurozone. The 
first Europe-wide regulatory approach was the introduction of a single Banking Directive 
in 2000, which was amended in 2006 to reflect the Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) 
guidelines together with the Capital Adequacy Directive (Capital Requirement Directive 
(CRD) I). As a response to the financial crisis, the Commission adopted the second 
legislative package (CRD II) in September 2009. An additional set of rules was adopted in 
November 2010 (CRD III). Finally, and to further strengthen the banking system, the 
Commission adopted a Capital Requirement Directive (CRD IV) to address access to 
deposit taking activities as well as a Capital Requirement Regulation (CRR) to establish 
prudential requirements for banks in July 2011. 
Basel II stipulates that banks back all exposures with own funds based either on a 
given regulatory risk weight (the so-called “standardized approach”, or SA) or on an 
internally modeled default probability (the so-called “internal ratings-based approach”, or 
IRB). Sovereign exposures receive a risk-weight ranging from 0% to 150% in the SA as 
stipulated in paragraph 53 of the Basel II accord. However, paragraph 54 states: “At 
national discretion, a lower risk weight may be applied to banks’ exposures to their 
sovereign (or central bank) of incorporation denominated in domestic currency and funded 
in that currency.” This provides national regulators an option to deviate from the original 
risk-weighting and might imply zero risk weights. 
The Basel II IRB approach for calculating risk weights does not necessarily 
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stipulate zero risk weights for highly rated sovereign debt, but suggests a granular 
approach. Paragraph 260 of the Basel II accord, however, allows banks to use the 
standardized approach for certain exposure, if they are “immaterial in terms of size and 
perceived risk profile.”  
The CRR - which implements the new Basel framework – also contains two 
approaches for calculation sovereign risk weights that are generally based on the Basel II 
accord.  In the standardized approach, according to Article 114(4) of the CRR, “exposures 
to Member States’ central governments and central banks denominated and funded in the 
domestic currency of that central government and central bank shall be assigned a risk 
weight of 0%.” In the EMU, this exemption is thus immediately applicable to all banks 
and all their holdings of domestic and non-domestic sovereign debt issued by EMU 
countries and in euros, leading to a preferential treatment of sovereign bonds irrespective 
of sovereign risk.7 Article 150 of the CRR also permits banks using the IRB approach to 
apply the standardized approach only to sovereign bond exposures and irrespective of their 
size as long as these exposures have a zero risk-weight in the standardized approach 
(“permanent partial use”) – an exemption that IRB banks frequently employ (Hannoun 
2011). The CRR is thus much more comprehensive in exempting sovereign bonds from 
applying risk-adjusted risk weights compared to the Basel accord. In this paper, we 
investigate the implications of zero-risk weighting of sovereign debt for crisis spillovers in 
the Eurozone.  
 
                                                 
7 According to Article 114(5) of the CRR a risk weighting of 0% to be applied to all exposures to an EU 
Member State central government in the domestic currency of any other EU Member State, provided it is 
funded in that same currency and for a transitional period. This transitional period ends December 31, 2017 
and the rule is phased out until 2020. 
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3. Measuring sovereign risk spillovers 
3.1. Data sources 
To identify crisis spillovers in the Eurozone, we construct our dataset from various 
sources. We measure sovereign default risk using 5-year sovereign CDS spreads and 
collect daily sovereign CDS spreads together with other financial market indicators (e.g., 
iTraxx, equity indices, VSTOXX, EONIA, Euribor, and EUR effective exchange rates) 
from Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters Datastream and the ECB. Data on banks’ non-
domestic sovereign exposures come from two sources. First, and as our primary source, we 
use quarterly data (from 2010-Q4 to 2012-Q4) obtained from the Bank for International 
Settlements’ (BIS) consolidated banking statistics for all non-domestic sovereign 
exposures at the banking sector level for seven countries: Belgium, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom.8 This dataset is the most comprehensive 
both regarding time series and cross-sectional data availability and we use banks’ exposure 
to all 27 EU sovereigns.  
As this dataset only includes seven countries, we use data from the stress tests and 
capital exercises that were conducted and published by the EBA during the period from 
March 2010 to June 2012 as a second data source. The EBA data comprise sovereign bond 
holdings at the individual bank level for up to 90 major European banks from 21 countries 
at five points in time: December 2009, December 2010, October 2011, December 2011, 
and June 2012. We complement our dataset with quarterly bank financial data from SNL 
Financial and quarterly country-level macroeconomic data provided by the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the ECB. Appendix 1 provides 
an overview of the data sources and detailed definitions of the variables used in our 
                                                 
8 Note that the BIS only provides a separation into different exposure classes starting in Q4 2010. 
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analysis.  
3.2. Constructing the “sovereign subsidy” measure 
To adequately reflect the risk of its assets, a bank translates its exposures into risk-
weighted assets (RWA) using specific risk weights and funds a percentage of these RWA 
with capital against unexpected losses. As discussed above, risk weights associated with 
sovereign debt are set to zero. However, to estimate the extent of missing capital in the 
banking system due to zero risk weights, we assign risk weights to each sovereign 
exposure and compute the corresponding RWA that are not funded with capital.9 We call 
this new measure a “sovereign subsidy”. The subsidy is computed as follows: 
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑅𝑊𝑗,𝑡 ∗  𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ,
𝐽
𝑗=1
 
with i indicating the domestic sovereign/country, j the exposure (i.e., the foreign 
counterparty sovereign), both measured at book values, and t the time (i.e., a quarter). 
To compute the appropriate risk weights for sovereign exposures, we follow a 
three-step procedure. First, we collect ratings information on all Eurozone countries from 
the three largest rating agencies (Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch) for each exposure 
date (i.e., end of quarter for the BIS dataset and stress test dates for the EBA dataset). In 
the second step, we assign a probability of default (PD) to each sovereign based on the 
ratings and the corresponding PD measures that were used by the EBA in its stress tests. 
Third, we use the Basel Committee's Internal IRB formula and standard assumptions of 
loss given default (LGD) of 45% and 2.5 years maturity to compute the risk weight for 
                                                 
9 Note that this approach results in an RWA measure that can be translated into a capital requirement by 
applying the respective capital adequacy ratio or minimum capital ratio as described in an Online Appendix. 
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each sovereign exposure.10 
Figure 1 shows the size of the sovereign subsidy and its development over time. It 
provides the sum of the total (domestic and non-domestic) sovereign subsidy for all banks 
that were part of the EBA stress tests in 2009-2012. Banks from non-peripheral countries 
accumulate a sovereign subsidy of more than €300 billion and non-domestic sovereign 
debt accounts for more than two-thirds of it. Interestingly, the total sovereign subsidy and 
the fraction of non-domestic sovereign debt hardly change over time. The subsidy of banks 
from peripheral countries (i.e., Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), in contrast, 
increases from approximately €150 billion in 2009 to more than €300 billion in 2012. 
About 80%-90% of this subsidy is driven by domestic sovereign debt. This is consistent 
with an increase in home bias of peripheral banks that accelerated with the Long-Term 
Refinancing Operations (LTRO) of the ECB in December 2011 and February 2012 (Farhi 
and Tirole, 2016).11 Overall, Figure 1 emphasizes how strongly integrated European 
financial markets are with respect to banks’ sovereign bond holdings and that the 
sovereign subsidy, and thus the missing capital in banks’ balance sheets, related to these 
sovereign bond holdings, is considerable. 
3.3. The co-movement of sovereign CDS spreads 
To investigate the impact of non-domestic sovereign subsidies on sovereign risk, 
we construct ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 as our main dependent variable, which is defined as the daily 
change in the natural log of the CDS spread of a specific sovereign i:  
                                                 
10 The Online Appendix provides an overview of the resulting risk weights using credit ratings as well as 
CDS spread implied PDs as an alternative method.  
11 We provide more descriptive statistics in the online appendix. 
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∆𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3
∗ [∆𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡
] + 𝛽4𝑋𝑡  + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 . 
We estimate the model using a 60-day period (i.e., 30 days before and 30 days after 
the reporting date (last day of the quarter)) as in Acharya et al. (2011). 
∆𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is the change in a logarithmic European sovereign CDS index 
that is weighted with the non-domestic (j) sovereign exposure of country i's financial 
sector during time t (i.e., by 𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡/ ∑ 𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡)
𝐽
𝑗=1 . 
𝛽1 thus accounts for the relation between the exposure-weighted average change in non-
domestic sovereign CDS spreads and the change in a country’s CDS spread. 
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the non-domestic sovereign subsidy (i.e., the risk-
weighted exposures of country i's financial sector to all non-domestic Eurozone sovereigns 
in time t as described in detail in section 3.2.) scaled by the GDP of country i and  𝛽2 
captures its relation to the change in a country’s CDS spread.  
The coefficient of primary interest is 𝛽3, which captures how the co-movement 
between a country’s CDS spread with the European sovereign CDS index varies with the 
country’s sovereign subsidy. We expect to see an amplification of risk spillovers, i.e., a 
stronger co-movement of the country’s CDS spread with the European sovereign CDS 
index, through sovereign subsidies, which implies a positive and significant coefficient 
𝛽3.
12 In some specifications, we also add week fixed effects (𝛿𝑡) and country-quarter (𝛾𝑖,𝑡) 
                                                 
12 In addition, we use a set of time-varying control variables at the daily level (Xt) to account for additional 
covariates that might affect changes in credit risk, including changes in a corporate CDS market index 
(ΔiTraxx), an equity market index (ΔDS Equity Index), the market volatility (ΔVSTOXX), the term spread 
(computed from EONIA and 12-month Euribor, ΔTerm Spread), and the EUR effective exchange rate 
(ΔEUR Exchange Rate). We also include quarterly banking sector characteristics, such as the Capital Ratio 
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fixed effects.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics of our variables. In the periods surrounding the 
reporting dates for financial sector sovereign bond holdings (end of quarter from 2010-Q4 
to 2012-Q4), the average CDS spreads of the sovereigns in our dataset exhibit an average 
daily change of -0.17% (the average sovereign CDS spread around the reporting dates is 
252 bps). Although the average change is rather small, the standard deviation for the daily 
changes is relatively high and there are periods with large changes of approximately 20% 
(both upward and downward). The average daily change in the exposure-weighted 
sovereign CDS index (ΔLogCDS Index) is -0.14% during our sample period, but also 
shows a relatively large standard deviation.13 
4. Understanding sovereign risk spillovers 
4.1. Benchmark specification 
Table 2 reports the results of our baseline model. In the specifications shown in 
columns (1) to (4), we use heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Column (1) shows the 
results of an OLS regression without control variables. As expected and reflecting the co-
movement of CDS spreads across Eurozone countries, the effect of ΔLogCDS Index on 
ΔLogCDS is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. If the CDS index increases by 
100bps the sovereign CDS spread increases, on average, by 85bps. Importantly, the 
coefficient of the interaction term ΔLogCDS Index x Sovereign Subsidy/GDP is positive 
                                                                                                                                                   
(the ratio of equity to total assets), the Deposit Ratio (the ratio of deposits to total assets), the Funding 
Fragility (the ratio of net loans to deposits), the Income Diversity (the ratio of net interest income to total 
operating income), the Liquidity (the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets), and the financial 
sector Concentration (measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index). All bank characteristics are aggregated 
at the country level weighted by bank asset size. 
13 EU sovereign CDS spreads within the eurozone but also with non-eurozone EU countries such as the U.K. 
show significant co-movement. Changes in CDS spreads are highly correlated across European sovereigns, 
with correlation coefficients between individual sovereign CDS changes ranging between 0.6 and 0.9 on 
average from 2010 to 2012.  
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and highly significant, i.e. a change in the European sovereign CDS index has a larger 
impact on the CDS spread of an individual sovereign if its banking sector as a whole has a 
larger exposure to non-domestic sovereign debt not funded with capital. If the subsidy 
increases from the 25th to the 75th percentile, the sovereign CDS spread increases by 
another 9bps, on average, in addition to the effect resulting from the co-movement of the 
CDS spread and the CDS index.14 This is consistent with the interpretation that a larger 
sovereign subsidy increases the likelihood of a capital shortfall of the domestic financial 
sector in case of a sovereign default (and thus the likelihood of a government bailout), 
which is reflected in elevated sovereign CDS spreads. 
In column (2) of Table 2, we add variables that capture capital market fluctuations 
and the macroeconomic environment with daily frequency. We also control for quarterly 
bank fundamentals that might affect sovereign CDS spreads such as leverage, asset and 
funding liquidity and bank competition. As expected, changes in corporate CDS spreads 
(as measured through the iTraxx index) also increase sovereign CDS spreads. In column 
(3), we add week fixed effects, which control for short-term interest rates.  
In column (4), we add country-quarter fixed effects, which absorb all factors that 
might affect sovereign CDS spreads at the country level in each quarter including shocks 
to banks’ domestic sovereign bond portfolio that can lead to elevated sovereign CDS 
spreads. We find a larger co-movement of sovereign CDS spreads with a European 
sovereign CDS index when the domestic banking sector has a larger sovereign subsidy.  
In column (5) we use the same specification shown in column (4) but cluster 
                                                 
14 Holdings of foreign bonds might also be more prevalent in larger countries, which could increase the 
connection between foreign sovereign bond holdings and the co-movement of domestic sovereign CDS and 
the European CDS index. Instead of using a European sovereign CDS index, we include the sovereign 
subsidy associated with individual GIIPS exposures for each bank. The results continue to hold and are 
reported in an Online Appendix. 
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standard-errors at the country-quarter level (to control for correlation across country-
quarter clusters). While the coefficient of our interaction term is still significant at the 5% 
level, its standard error is substantially higher compared to before. A possible reason is a 
small number of clusters, for example, because spillovers are relevant only for some 
countries but not others. We test this explicitly in the next section. In all further tests, 
unless otherwise noted, we cluster standard errors at the country-quarter level to account 
for correlations across country-quarters.15 
4.2. Spillovers from peripheral to core Eurozone countries 
The model in Bolton and Jeanne (2011) suggests that a sovereign-bank loop can 
develop in safer non-GIIPS countries because of financial crisis spillovers when markets 
are financially integrated, e.g. through the holdings of non-domestic sovereign debt. GIIPS 
banks, on the other hand, have large domestic sovereign bond exposures and are thus less 
affected by spillovers. We therefore split our sample in riskier GIIPS countries and safer 
non-GIIPS countries and investigate whether non-GIIPS sovereigns exhibit a larger co-
movement with our sovereign CDS index compared with GIIPS countries. The results for 
the sample of non-GIIPS countries are reported in Panel A of Table 3.  
Similar to above, the effect of ΔLogCDS Index on ΔLogCDS is positive and 
significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient of the interaction term ΔLogCDS Index x 
Sovereign Subsidy/GDP is also positive and significant at the 1 percent level, i.e. a change 
in the CDS index has a larger impact on the CDS spread of non-GIIPS sovereigns if their 
banking sectors have a larger sovereign subsidy. The economic magnitude, however, is 
                                                 
15 We provide a series of robustness tests (1) using bond yields as dependent variable, (2) including a 
quadratic interaction term and CDS Index to account for non-linearities, (3) interact our control variables 
with the CDS index to account for differences in financial sector health and (4) using EBA (stress test) data 
which include more countries but only the largest banks in each country. All results continue to hold. We 
report this table in an Online Appendix. 
 18 
about 30% larger compared with the benchmark specification, i.e. the co-movement of 
sovereign CDS spreads increases by 12bps if the sovereign subsidy increases from the 25th 
to the 75th percentile. 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the results regressing GIIPS sovereign CDS spreads on 
the sovereign CDS index interacted with the sovereign subsidy on GIIPS banks’ non-
domestic sovereign exposures as well as other control variables. Interestingly and in 
contrast to our earlier results, the interaction term ΔCDS Index x Sovereign Subsidy/GDP 
does not load significantly in our model. In other words, our results are consistent with the 
view that financial crises can spread across financially integrated economies increasing the 
risk and funding cost of even safer sovereigns because of implicit guarantees for their 
domestic banking sectors.   
4.3. Sovereign exposure and bank sector credit risk 
This section analyzes the effect of Eurozone sovereign risk on bank sector credit 
risk. A possible concern with our country level regression is that we cannot control for 
common factors that increase both bank and sovereign risk or (time-invariant) bank 
specific risk factors that increase sovereign risk but that are unrelated to spillovers due to 
the sovereign subsidy. Bank level regressions can help to isolate the effect of non-domestic 
sovereign risk on banks due to the sovereign subsidy. If banks’ sovereign exposure affects 
sovereign risk because banks do not fund them with capital, we expect to see an increase 
in banks’ own CDS spreads because of elevated default risk if non-domestic sovereign risk 
increases. As shown in Acharya et al. (2014a), domestic sovereign risk increases banks’ 
CDS spread. We carefully control for domestic sovereign risk in our empirical approach 
because the sovereign-to-bank feedback loop should be particularly important for GIIPS 
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banks. 
4.3.1.  Bank level methodology 
To identify the effects of non-domestic sovereign risk exposures on bank risk, we 
control for heterogeneity in banks’ exposure to changes in macroeconomic fundamentals 
using bank fixed effects and allowing for bank specific coefficients on a corporate CDS 
market index (iTraxx Europe index) and a volatility index (VSTOXX) which are important 
factors in the pricing of credit risk of banks. Moreover, we include weekly fixed effects 
and country-quarter fixed effects. 
Specifically, we estimate the following OLS regression: 
∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑚,𝑖,𝑡)
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑚,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑚,𝑡
+ 𝛽3 [∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡) ∗
𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑚,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑚,𝑡
]
+ 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5∆𝑋𝑚,𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜗𝑚 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 . 
where ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑚,𝑖,𝑡) is the daily change in the natural logarithm of the 
CDS spread of bank m headquartered in country i in the 30-day period around the 
exposure reporting date. 𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑚,𝑡/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑚,𝑡 is a bank’s non-domestic 
sovereign subsidy scaled by total assets using a banks’ exposure at the beginning of the 
sample period as an instrument. 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡) is the daily change in the natural logarithm of 
the domestic (i) sovereign CDS spread. ∆𝑋𝑚,𝑖,𝑡  are daily changes in the control variables, 
𝜗𝑚 are bank fixed-effects and 𝛿𝑡 are time fixed effects. 
4.3.2.  Results 
Table 4 presents the results. We separately present results for the full sample, and 
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subsamples of non-GIIPS and GIIPS banks and always show the result with and without 
week fixed effects. We first report the results for the full sample without the domestic 
sovereign CDS spread. The coefficient on the interaction term is highly significant and the 
results support the view that a larger sovereign subsidy (i.e., a lack of capital to support 
risky sovereign debt) increases bank credit risk when sovereign risk increases which is 
reflected in higher bank CDS spreads. An increase in the CDS index by 10% increases 
banks’ CDS spreads, on average, by 0.1%.16 This effect almost doubles when the 
sovereign subsidy increases from the 25th to the 75th percentile. 
Next, we examine the sovereign-bank feedback loop and include the domestic 
sovereign CDS index (columns (3) and (4)). A 10% increase in the domestic CDS spread 
increases bank CDS spreads by 0.1% consistent with a sovereign-to-bank feedback loop. 
Interestingly, the coefficient on the CDS index does not load significantly anymore and an 
explanation might be that sovereign risk differentially affects GIIPS vs non-GIIPS bank 
credit risk, an issue we turn to next. 
 Finally, we examine the effect of an increase in non-domestic sovereign risk on 
bank credit risk for GIIPS versus non-GIIPS banks. Columns (5) and (6) show the results 
for non-GIIPS banks without and with time fixed effects and columns (7) and (8) the 
results for GIIPS banks. We find important differences in both sub-samples. The non-
domestic sovereign CDS index loads significantly and positively on banks’ CDS spreads 
in the sample of non-GIIPS banks. On average, a 10% increase in the CDS spreads 
increases bank CDS spreads by 1.4%. This effect is about 50% larger when the sovereign 
subsidy is at its 75th percentile.  
We do not find similar effects in the sub-sample of GIIPS banks: a change in non-
                                                 
16 This effect is similar in magnitude to the one reported in Acharya et al. (2014a). 
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domestic sovereign risk does not increase GIIPS banks’ CDS spreads. We also add the 
domestic sovereign CDS spread and investigate how changes in domestic sovereign risk 
differentially affect GIIPS and non-GIIPS banks. The effect is much smaller for non-
GIIPS relative to GIIPS banks. A 10% increase of the domestic sovereign CDS spread 
increases non-GIIPS banks’ CDS spread by about 0.46%. However, the same increase in 
domestic sovereign CDS spreads increases GIIPS banks’ CDS spreads by about 1.6%.  
These results support the view that domestic sovereign-to-bank linkages are 
particularly important for GIIPS banks as in Acharya et al. (2014a). In contrast, non-
domestic sovereign risk spills over to safer countries and increases bank risk particularly 
of those banks which have non-domestic sovereign bond exposures not funded with 
capital. 
5. Isolating the zero-risk weight channel 
Our prior results are consistent with the interpretation that a lack of capital in the banking 
system due to the application of zero risk weights facilitates spillovers of financial crises in 
the Eurozone. Using different tests, we further isolate the role of zero risk weights and 
show that this is the first-order channel through which spillovers occur. As risks spill over 
from GIIPS to non-GIIPS countries, we perform all tests on non-GIIPS countries. 
5.1. Understanding risk weights 
To understand the role of risk weights, we use different ways to calculate risk weights for 
Eurozone government bonds. One could challenge the use of risk weights that are 
generally applied to exposures of non-financial firms and argue that sovereigns, for 
example, can raise taxes or that government bonds also provide valuable services for 
governments and banks and contribute positively to public debt or liquidity management. 
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Sovereign risk weights should thus be lower thereby casting doubt on the zero risk weight 
spillover channel. We revisit these arguments in this sub-section. We provide the results in 
Table 5. 
5.1.1. Calculating risk weights using a country’s budget deficit 
In a first test, we use a country’s budget deficit to set risk weights. That is, we calculate the 
missing capital and apply a zero risk weight when the country’s budget deficit is equal or 
smaller than 3% of the country’s GDP (as defined in the Maastricht-Criteria). If, however, 
a country’s budget deficit exceeds 3%, we apply the EBA risk weights as above. This 
method increases the country specific variation of risk-weights, not only between countries 
but also within a country over time. Importantly, this measure explicitly considers that 
fiscally sound countries are less likely to default and that their bonds, by applying a zero 
risk weight, provide valuable services to both banks and governments. We show this in 
column (1) of Table 5. The economic magnitude does not change much compared to our 
benchmark specification in Table 3 Panel A, i.e. the co-movement of sovereign CDS 
spreads increases by 12bps when the sovereign subsidy increases from the 25th to the 75th 
percentile. 
5.1.2. Calculating risk weights using different loss-given-defaults (LGD) 
We use a LGD of 45% throughout our tests and for all sovereign exposures. This is 
reasonable. For example, Moody’s (2017) reports average recovery rates in their sample of 
sovereign bonds between 30% and 65% (depending on their methodology) suggesting an 
LGD of 35% to 70%. Recovery rates of Greek sovereign bonds were, on average, even 
lower (between 25% and 40%), in other words, while sovereign defaults might be rare 
events, losses for bondholders might be very high.  
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Sovereign defaults are infrequent and so is data on recovery rates. We thus use data 
provided by Cruces and Trebesch (2013) on defaults and recovery rates in emerging 
markets. While these countries are usually very different from Eurozone countries, we use 
information on past defaults of Brazil, one of the wealthiest emerging market countries, 
which should be most comparable to some peripheral countries such as Portugal. 
Calculating a simple mean across Brazil’s defaulted bonds, we find an average LGD of 
17%, much smaller than what we find for Greece and Cyprus. We re-run our tests 
calculating risk-weights using a 17% LGD and report the results in column (2) of Table 5. 
The economic magnitude decreases by 1bps relative to column (1) as the subsidy also 
decreases in size. 
5.1.3. CDS implied risk-weights 
As an alternative to risk weights that rely on ratings, we use CDS implied probabilities of 
default in column (3). Using conversion factors from Hull et al. (2005), we approximate 
physical PDs from the CDS implied risk-neutral PDs. We then use the Basel IRB formula 
and standard assumptions of LGD of 45% and 2.5 years maturity to compute risk weights 
for sovereign exposures from these PDs. Applying the CDS implied risk weights results in 
sovereign subsidy values that are, on average, almost twice as high as those used in our 
main analysis. Our EBA risk weight measures should thus be viewed as conservative and a 
lower bound of the sovereign subsidy. Using CDS implied risk weights confirms our 
previous results that the co-movement of sovereign CDS spreads increase with the 
sovereign subsidy. The economic magnitude does not change relative to the benchmark 
specification in Table 3. 
5.1.4. Exposure at default (EAD) 
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We argue that the source of spillovers is the zero risk-weighting of sovereign debt. The 
sovereign subsidy, however, might increase when either the risk weight or the actual 
exposure towards a foreign sovereign increases. We address this in two ways. First, we 
replace the sovereign subsidy with the banks’ actual exposure to non-domestic sovereign 
debt (EAD) to investigate whether our results can be explained by the exposure itself and 
not by zero risk weights. Column (4) of Table 5 shows that the interaction term ΔLogCDS 
Index x EAD/GDP does not load significantly in our model highlighting again the 
importance of the missing capital in bank balance sheets.  
Second, we use a bank’s foreign sovereign bond exposures at the beginning of the 
observation period as an instrument for exposures at later reporting dates, i.e. the sovereign 
subsidy only varies with changes in the risk weights. We also compute the CDS index 
using these constant exposures, i.e. the index does not mechanically increase if banks 
increase their exposure to a foreign country. The results in column (5) show that the 
interaction term is highly significant suggesting that our results are driven by changes in 
risk weights rather than by exposure changes. 
5.2. Other financial crisis spillover channels 
5.2.1. Common shocks 
First, we analyze the effect of possible common factors that drive both the 
sovereign CDS spread as well as the sovereign CDS index. These common factors can be 
both global shocks such as the global financial crisis or sovereign debt crisis or other 
factors such as spillovers between groups of countries e.g. due to trade and other economic 
linkages. Countries in the Eurozone are interconnected and thus subject to common 
 25 
shocks, which, however, may impact individual countries differentially.17 
We model economic linkages between countries using the common correlated 
effects (CCE) estimator of Pesaran (2006), where the unobserved common factors are 
proxied by the cross-sectional averages of the dependent variable and the regressors. This 
allows for more flexibility as the impact of the unobserved common factors can differ 
across countries while the evolution of these factors may be non-linear (Kapetanios et al., 
2011). In the pooled sample, the average thus needs to be interacted with country 
dummies, so that each country can have a different parameter on the cross-section 
averages.18 The results are presented in columns (1) of Table 6. The model fit improves 
when common factors are accounted for. As before, we find a positive and significant 
effect of ΔCDS Index on ΔLogCDS. More importantly, even after controlling for common 
effects, the coefficient of the interaction term is still comparable in size and is significant 
at the 1 percent level. Thus, our results are unlikely caused by common factors. 
We perform a second test to support this claim. Germany and France are among the 
largest Eurozone economies and thus are, by definition, more integrated than smaller 
countries. In additional tests, we drop both countries from our dataset and report the results 
in column (2) of Table 6. The coefficient of the interaction term is still statistically and 
economically significant. I.e. accounting for integration as an important source of 
spillovers, missing capital due to zero risk weights is a first-order spillover channel. 
5.2.2. Direct transfers between countries 
                                                 
17 In our earlier fixed-effect specifications, we include time fixed effects that account for unobserved 
macroeconomic shocks. While these fixed effects proxy for some common factors, they do not account for 
heterogeneous effects among countries and, moreover, might not address the cross-sectional dependence 
caused by them. 
18 As the averages contain various unobserved parameters, the loadings on the interaction terms cannot be 
interpreted and should be seen as accounting for cross-section dependence in the data. 
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Bolton and Jeanne (2011) suggest that sovereigns have the choice to either support 
their domestic banking sector or to directly bail out governments in stress using direct 
transfers. To control for this alternative spillover channel, we augment our model and 
include proxies to measure direct bailout risk. As a first proxy, we use the share of the 
(contingent) liability sovereigns assume through the stability mechanisms in the Eurozone. 
These are (i) each sovereign’s share in the temporary assistance vehicle, the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), (ii) each sovereign's share in the permanent support 
vehicle, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and (iii) the risk that sovereigns 
ultimately assume through the purchase of debt instruments by the ECB. Because all of 
these measures are a direct function of the capital share of these sovereigns in the ECB 
(ECB, 2011), we take ECB share as our proxy for bailout risk. The average share in 
subscribed capital of the ECB (and likewise, for example, in the ESM) is 11.8%, with 
Germany holding the largest share at 27.1%, whereas the share of the U.K. is zero. 
We also control for a country’s bailout capacity. Some countries have more fiscal 
flexibility and might thus be less affected when sovereign risk in the Eurozone increases 
compared with other countries. We define a new variable Debt Ratio (measured as 
government debt over the country’s GDP) as a proxy for fiscal flexibility. A higher ratio 
suggests less capacity for a country to bail out its banking sector or to provide direct 
assistance to other sovereigns. The average Debt Ratio is 102% ranging from 60% (Spain 
in 2010) to almost 140% (Italy in 2012). 
In column (3) of Table 6 we include both proxies in our regressions, as well as 
their interaction terms with ΔLogCDS Index. Consistent with a direct spillover channel 
between sovereigns, a larger ECB share increases the co-movement of European sovereign 
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CDS spreads. The coefficient of the interaction between ΔLogCDS Index and the ECB 
Share is positive and significant at the 1 percent level throughout all specifications. A 
higher Debt Ratio, however, does not significantly affect sovereign CDS spreads. 
Importantly, even when controlling for these alternative transmission channels the effect of 
the banks’ non-domestic European sovereign exposures on sovereign risk spillovers 
remains largely unchanged.  
5.2.3. Non-sovereign cross-country exposures 
Finally, we investigate whether the non-sovereign cross-country exposures of 
banks could explain our results. We use data on banks’ risk-weighted exposures to 
financial institutions, retail and corporate sectors as disclosed by the BIS and include them 
in our analysis. We also use interaction terms with ΔLogCDS Index. The results are 
reported in columns (4) and (5) of Table 6. While we observe some spillovers also from 
non-sovereign exposures, the coefficient on the interaction term ΔLogCDS Index x 
Sovereign Subsidy/GDP in column (6) remains highly statistically significant and is also 
larger in economic magnitude than the effect from non-sovereign spillovers.  
Taken together, while some other cross-country linkages lead to risk spillovers 
from stressed countries to other European sovereigns, the transmission through banks’ 
foreign sovereign bond holdings and the corresponding sovereign subsidy (or missing 
capital) is an important channel that contributes to risk spillovers in addition and beyond 
these other channels.    
6. Bank capital and sovereign risk spillovers 
Our results so far indicate that sovereign risk spillovers within the Eurozone are 
amplified by banks’ holdings of non-domestic sovereign bonds that are not funded with 
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capital. If missing capital related to the zero risk weight regulation for Eurozone sovereign 
bonds is a concern, then funding sovereign bonds with capital reflecting the risk of the 
exposure should attenuate sovereign risk spillovers.  
We study the effect of funding non-domestic sovereign bonds with equity capital in 
three scenarios. First, we examine banks’ exposures to non-Eurozone sovereigns which 
they are required to fund with risk-adjusted equity levels (Section 6.1). Second, we take 
into account the role of banks’ voluntary capital buffers for sovereign debt (Section 6.2). 
Third, we exploit the EBA’s capital exercise in September 2011 that required banks to 
build up a temporary capital buffer to account for risky sovereign debt in their portfolios 
(Section 6.3).  
6.1. Non-Eurozone sovereign debt exposures  
In a first test, we run falsification tests using banks’ exposure to non-Eurozone 
member states for which zero risk regulation does not apply. Hence, we do not expect to 
observe a similar effect for these exposures, as banks have to deploy capital that reflects 
the risk associated with holding the respective sovereign bonds. The BIS also reports the 
exposures to countries such as Japan and the U.S., for which zero risk weight regulation 
does not apply. We calculate a “quasi-sovereign subsidy” that reflects the risk-weighted 
sovereign debt exposure and the resulting potential capital shortfall if banks did not have 
to fund them with capital. The Quasi-Sovereign Subsidy/GDP for the non-EU countries is 
comparable in size to the sovereign subsidies towards the GIIPS countries in our sample.19 
CDS spread changes are smaller in the U.S. or Japan compared to those in stressed 
                                                 
19 The quasi-sovereign subsidy as a share of GDP on U.S. sovereign bond holdings is 0.5% which is very 
similar to the sovereign subsidy as a share of GDP towards Italy (0.6%). The respective quasi-subsidy on 
Japanese sovereign bond holdings is 0.2% which is similar in size to the sovereign subsidies on Spanish, 
Greek or Portuguese sovereign bond holdings. 
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countries in the Eurozone. We thus focus on time periods during which we observe almost 
a doubling of the CDS spreads in these countries.20 The U.S. sovereign spread increased 
from around 40bp to 70bp between the end of 2011-Q1 and the end of 2011-Q2, whereas 
the Japanese sovereign spread increased from 70bp to 125bp between the end of 2011-Q1 
and 2011-Q4. While there was no crisis in the U.S. and Japan comparable to the sovereign 
debt crisis in the GIIPS countries, an almost doubling of the CDS spread can be considered 
a considerable stress event. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 7, we report the results 
focusing on European banks’ exposure to U.S. sovereign debt; columns (3) and (4) include 
the results of European banks’ exposures to Japanese sovereign debt. We find that the 
CDS spread changes of European sovereigns are positively and significantly related to the 
CDS spread changes of non-EU member countries. However, the coefficient of the 
interaction term of the non-EU sovereign CDS spread changes and our quasi-sovereign 
subsidy measure does not load significantly in our regression models. This result indicates 
that risk spillovers among EU and non-EU sovereigns are not amplified by banks’ non-EU 
sovereign bond exposures because banks have in fact sufficient equity capital funding 
these exposures. 
6.2. Cross-sectional differences in bank capitalization 
So far we have implicitly assumed that banks take full advantage of the zero risk 
weight regulation, whereas some banks voluntarily fund these exposures with equity 
capital.21 Banks do not usually report this information in their annual reports but the EBA 
                                                 
20 In Japan, an important event that significantly increased sovereign CDS spreads was the Fukushima 
catastrophe. In the U.S., elevated sovereign CDS spread changes were driven by the large budget deficit and 
debt ceiling debate in 2011 together with the expected downgrade of U.S. government bonds.  
21 A common thread to different theory papers is that banks voluntary hold capital above the minimum 
capital requirement as it increases the survival likelihood in times of crises (e.g. Holmström and Tirole 
(1997), Acharya et al. (2016a), Allen et al. (2011), Mehran and Thakor (2011), and Thakor (2012)). These 
papers argue that capital helps banks to attract funds and provides incentives for banks to monitor their 
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published information on banks’ RWA by exposures for the first time in June 2012. We 
aggregate the individual exposures at the country level and, given that we only have a 
single data point, assume that the risk weights banks applied for sovereign debt remained 
constant throughout our sample period. We construct a new variable RWA Coverage as a 
bank’s risk weighted assets for EU sovereign exposure recorded for the banks in one 
country over total EU sovereign exposure. We exploit the cross-sectional variation in RWA 
Coverage to identify the effect of bank capital on sovereign risk spillovers and present the 
results in Table 8.  
In columns (1) and (2) we augment our baseline specifications and include the 
triple interaction RWA Coverage x ΔLogCDS Index x Sovereign Subsidy/GDP (and all the 
respective individual interaction terms and secular effects). The triple interaction is 
significantly negative suggesting that a larger capital buffer related to foreign sovereign 
bond holdings mitigates sovereign risk spillovers. Given that the interaction term 
ΔLogCDS Index x Sovereign Subsidy/GDP is still significantly positive and larger, these 
voluntary capital buffers are not sufficient to eliminate sovereign risk spillovers through 
banks’ foreign sovereign bond holdings. The economic magnitude of the coefficient of the 
interaction term ΔLogCDS Index x Sovereign Subsidy/GDP is similar as in the benchmark 
specification. A sovereign subsidy at the 75th percentile increases the co-movement by 
about 9bps relative to the 25th percentile. If the banking sector has a high exposure at the 
75th percentile, an increase in the coverage ratio, say from the 25th to the 75th percentile, 
decreases the co-movement by about 5bps. 
Instead of accounting for RWA for sovereign debt, we control for banks’ equity-to-
                                                                                                                                                   
relationship borrowers more closely, to attenuate asset-substitution moral hazard, or to make innovative but 
risky products that elevate the probability of financial crises less attractive. Berger and Bouwman (2013) also 
document considerable heterogeneity in bank capital ratios in the U.S. 
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asset ratio (Capital Ratio) in columns (3) and (4) of Table 8. Again, a larger Capital Ratio 
(i.e., a larger capital buffer) should reduce sovereign risk spillovers. And indeed, we find a 
negative and significant coefficient on the triple interaction term Capital Ratio x ΔLogCDS 
Index x Sovereign Subsidy/GDP. However, even a large Capital Ratio is not sufficient to 
eliminate sovereign risk spillovers within the EU through banks’ holdings of bonds of 
foreign EU sovereigns given that the interaction term ΔLogCDS Index x Sovereign 
Subsidy/GDP is significantly positive and larger. 
6.3. The September 2011 capital exercise  
While European bank regulations have not removed the advantages associated with 
sovereign debt in the Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive (CRR/CDR IV), the 
EBA conducted a capitalization exercise (CE) in September 2011. The EBA requested that 
participating banks accumulate a capital buffer to account for risky sovereign debt in their 
portfolios and temporarily increase their Core Tier 1 capital ratios to 9% by the end of 
June 2012.22 This step can be interpreted as a de facto implementation of risk weights on 
sovereign debt exposures for the participating banks. In fact, this is the first time that bank 
regulators officially acknowledged that sovereign debt is not risk-free and should be 
reflected in the capital requirements for banks. We examine whether the EBA CE reduces 
the sovereign subsidy and, thereby, the spillover risks from non-domestic sovereign 
exposures.  
In Figure 2, we plot the quarterly estimated betas of a regression of sovereign CDS 
spreads on a sovereign CDS index (Datastream’s Markit SovX index) over time. From 
                                                 
22 Thirty-seven banks showed an initial capital shortfall of €115 billion. Ten banks, including Dexia, 
Volksbank AG, West LB, and Bankia, as well as the six Greek banks were already under restructuring and 
had separate capital plans. The remaining 27 banks had a shortfall of €76 billion; by June 2012, the 27 banks 
raised a total of €115.7 billion through direct capital measures (by issuing, for example, equity or convertible 
securities), as well as risk-weighted asset measures. 
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2011-Q4 onwards, the co-movement between a country’s sovereign CDS spread and the 
CDS index is considerably lower than before 2011-Q4, which is preliminary evidence that 
the increased capital buffer that the CE required mitigated sovereign risk spillovers within 
the EU.  
In the next step, we examine this more formally in our regression framework. In 
Table 9 we report the results from our baseline regressions with and without fixed effects 
for the time periods (i) before the CE, i.e. up to and including 2011-Q3, (ii) after the CE 
starting directly from 2011-Q4 when banks already had the information about the new 
requirement, (iii) after the CE starting from 2012-Q1 and (iv) after the CE starting from 
2012-Q2 when the requirement had to be fulfilled to assess when the effect of the 
additional capital becomes observable if at all. 
We find that the coefficient on the interaction term that proxies for the sovereign 
risk spillover through non-domestic sovereign exposures of the domestic financial sector 
(ΔLogCDS Index x Sovereign Subsidy/GDP) remains positive and highly significant before 
the EBA CE.  In contrast, it becomes insignificant and smaller over the three after-CE 
periods. Our results suggest that banks need some time to build up the additional capital 
buffer but that the additional capital eliminates sovereign risk spillovers within the EU 
once banks have accumulated a large enough buffer. 
In December 2011, the ECB conducted the first of its 3-year Long-Term 
Refinancing Operations (LTROs) providing about €500 billion to the banking system. If 
the LTRO helps stabilizing sovereign bond yields, attenuated spillovers might be due to 
the ECB’s program rather than an increase in equity capital to fund the exposures.  
Empirical results, however, do not support this claim. Acharya et al. (2016b), for 
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example, do not find a significant negative effect of the LTRO on sovereign yields. In 
contrast, sovereign yields reached new heights in mid-2012. They report that even though 
core country banks decreased their holdings of risky periphery sovereign bonds in early 
2012, their CDS spreads increased substantially with the increased sovereign risk in Spain 
and Italy. Krishnamurty et al. (2014) also find only a small effect of the LTROs on 
sovereign yields.23 It is thus unlikely that LTRO liquidity injections explain our results. 
Overall, our findings from these three scenarios strongly support our main 
hypothesis that sovereign CDS spreads exhibit a larger co-movement with European CDS 
spreads if domestic banks have large exposures for which they do not hold (sufficient) 
capital. Or in other words, when banks have larger capital buffers, the sovereign risk 
spillovers within the EU are considerably attenuated. 
7. Discussion  
We show that sovereign CDS spreads exhibit a larger co-movement with other 
European sovereign CDS spreads if domestic banks have larger foreign sovereign bond 
exposures that they do not fund with capital because of zero risk weights. While prior 
literature analyzes sovereign-bank feedback loops in crisis countries such as Ireland and 
Greece, we show that a sovereign-bank loop might develop even in the banking sectors of 
safer countries because of exposure to non-domestic sovereign debt and increase the risk 
and funding costs of sovereigns because of zero-risk weighting.  
While we discuss the ex-post costs associated with financial integration such as 
                                                 
23 Acharya et al. (2016b) emphasize the effectiveness of the OMT compared to the LTRO program that was 
initiated later in 2012 in reducing sovereign risk in the Eurozone. Importantly, the ECB provided liquidity to 
the banks in the LTRO transactions which segmented the sovereign bond market further preferentially 
towards GIIPS banks. This worsened the crisis when Italian and Spanish sovereign yields increased in spring 
2012. In the OMT, however, the ECB provided liquidity to the market at large, reducing the risks of fire 
sales and stabilizing asset prices. 
 34 
financial crisis spillovers24, we have not directly investigated the ex-ante benefits of 
financial integration and cross-border holdings of sovereign debt. However, the literature 
emphasizes benefits that need to be considered when discussing the implications of our 
findings. Cross-border holdings of sovereign bonds allow banks to diversify their 
sovereign bond portfolios (Bolton and Jeanne, 2011), to access liquidity (Holmström and 
Tirole, 2007) and to reduce the feedback-loop between sovereigns and domestic banks 
(Acharya et al., 2014a). Moreover, cross-border holdings can further enhance financial 
stability as they reduce the risks of fire sales (Diamond and Rajan, 2011) and might even 
attract non-bank investors and thus increases a country’s funding base (Acharya et al. 
2017). In other words, there are both benefits and costs of financial integration through 
cross-border sovereign bond holdings and it is an important question whether the costs 
outweigh the benefits. More research is needed to understand this trade-off.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
24 The literature also emphasizes other costs associated with cross-border holdings of sovereign bonds. For 
example, Bulow and Rogoff (1989) argue that sovereigns are less likely to default because they cannot 
selectively default only on bonds held outside the domestic banking sector. Consistently, Gennaioli et al. 
(2016) find that even in normal times, domestic banks in less developed countries hold a substantially larger 
fraction of domestic sovereign bonds compared with, e.g. European banks. 
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Figure 1: Sovereign subsidy: in peripheral and non-peripheral countries 
These figures display the sovereign subsidy, a risk-weighted asset equivalent of the sovereign exposures of 
banks in peripheral (GR, IE, IT, PT, ES) and non-peripheral countries. We display the sum of all risk-
weighted domestic and non-domestic EU sovereign exposures of banks contained in the EBA stress tests. 
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Figure 2: Betas of individual sovereign CDS and sovereign CDS market over time 
This figure shows the development of the average beta of the available countries' CDS spread changes with 
the changes in a sovereign CDS index over time. The betas are obtained by regressing the change of a 
sovereign's CDS spread onto the changes of a sovereign CDS index (Datastream series of SovX index). We 
report averages over all EU countries for which comprehensive data is available in the consolidated banking 
statistics of the BIS (BE, DE, ES, FR, IE, IT, UK) in the upper panel and all EU countries that form part of 
the EBA stress test and for which CDS spread time series are available (AT, BE, CY, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, 
GR, HU, IE, IT, NL, PL, PT, SI, SE, UK) in the lower panel. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics BIS data 
This table reports the summary statistics of the main variables using the BIS dataset. Appendix 1 provides variable descriptions and information on the data sources. 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Dependent variable 
      
∆Log CDS percent -0.17 3.82 -21.76 18.73 2,646 
Explanatory variables 
      
∆Log CDS index (individual weights) percent -0.14 3.33 -15.94 13.32 2,646 
Bank exposure to non-domestic sovereigns/GDP percent 8.6 3.75 4.42 18.22 2,646 
Sovereign subsidy/GDP percent 2.46 1.37 0.93 6.42 2,646 
RWA coverage ratio percent 1.77 0.56 0.87 2.60 2,646 
ECB capital share percent 11.77 9.69 0 27.1 2,646 
Government debt ratio percent 102.35 20.52 59.42 138.34 2,646 
Controls 
      
iTraxx index pts 134.23 31.23 94.2 207.96 2,646 
DS equity index index pts 1382.75 137.99 1129.06 1690.48 2,646 
VSTOXX index pts 25.8 7.66 14.86 53.55 2,646 
EONIA bps 52.41 39.27 6 171.5 2,646 
Euribor (12 months) bps 150.3 57.18 53.7 220.1 2,646 
Term spread bps 97.89 31.72 41.1 160.9 2,646 
EUR exchange rate ratio 100.74 2.94 94.45 106.91 2,646 
GDP mn EUR 1,255,582 746,400 132,538 2,562,339 2,646 
Capital ratio percent 4.9 1.22 3 7.77 2,646 
Deposit ratio percent 38.54 9.29 18.4 54.11 2,646 
Funding fragility percent 128.31 23.49 87.1 198.1 2,646 
Income diversity percent 62.55 10.38 49.18 83.88 2,646 
Liquidity ratio percent 11.86 2.78 6.51 18.08 2,646 
Concentration percent 10.65 4.18 6.03 19.29 2,646 
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Table 2: Sovereign subsidy and sovereign risk 
This table reports the results from regressions of changes in individual sovereign CDS spreads on changes in a 
European sovereign CDS index, the sovereign subsidy (i.e., risk-weighted exposures of the domestic financial 
sector toward non-domestic EU sovereigns), and the interaction between both variables using BIS data. The 
sovereign CDS index is weighted by the non-domestic sovereign exposures of a country's financial sector. CDS 
changes are computed on a daily level, covering ± 30 days around the exposure reporting date (end of quarter 
2010-Q4 to 2012-Q4). Control variables include market determinants of the changes in sovereign CDS spreads 
(i.e., the changes in the iTraxx index, in the stock market total return index, in overall volatility, in the term 
spread, and in the EUR effective exchange rate) and bank sector controls (i.e., capital ratio, deposit ratio, funding 
fragility, income diversity, liquidity, and bank sector concentration). The models in columns (3) to (5) 
additionally control for week fixed effects and/or country-quarter fixed effects. All regressions control for week 
and country-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroscedasticy robust or clustered at the country*quarter-
level and reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Model OLS OLS FE FE FE 
Dep. variable  Log CDS
LogCDS Index x Sovereign 
Subsidy/GDP
4.026*** 4.058*** 4.062*** 4.080*** 4.080** 
 
(1.063) (1.058) (1.021) (1.048) (1.837) 
LogCDS Index 0.846*** 0.766*** 0.705*** 0.708*** 0.708*** 
 
(0.036) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.066) 
Sovereign Subsidy/GDP -0.030 0.004 0.002 
  
 
(0.029) (0.044) (0.045) 
  
iTraxx

0.151*** 0.174*** 0.171*** 0.171*** 
                                                                                                          
 
(0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.043) 
DS Equity Index

0.069 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 
  
(0.065) (0.071) (0.071) (0.085) 
VSTOXX

-0.005 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
  
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) 
Term Spread

-0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
EUR Exchange Rate

-0.182 -0.133 -0.128 -0.128 
  
(0.159) (0.184) (0.184) (0.188) 
Capital Ratio 
 
0.026 0.021 
  
  
(0.076) (0.079) 
  
Deposit Ratio 
 
0.005 0.006 
  
  
(0.013) (0.014) 
  
Funding Fragility 
 
0.005 0.005 
  
  
(0.004) (0.004) 
  
Income Diversity 
 
0.002 0.002 
  
  
(0.008) (0.008) 
  
Liquidity 
 
0.020 0.020 
  
  
(0.036) (0.036) 
  
Concentration 
 
-0.032 -0.031 
  
  
(0.028) (0.028) 
  
Constant YES YES YES YES YES 
Week FE NO NO YES YES YES 
Country-Quarter FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Observations 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646 
Clustering no no no no country*quarter 
R2 (adj.) 0.683 0.687 0.686 0.687 0.686 
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Table 3: Distinguishing between exposures of non-GIIPS versus GIIPS countries 
Panel A of this table reports the results from a regression of changes in individual sovereign CDS on changes in 
a European sovereign CDS index, the sovereign subsidy (i.e., risk-weighted exposures of the domestic financial 
sector toward non-domestic EU sovereigns), and the interaction between both variables for a subsample of non-
GIIPS banks’ foreign sovereign exposures. Panel B reports the respective results for a subsample of GIIPS 
banks’ foreign sovereign exposures. Both panels use BIS data. The sovereign CDS index is weighted by the non-
domestic sovereign exposures of a country's financial sector. CDS changes are computed on a daily level, 
covering ± 30 days around the exposure reporting date (end of quarter 2010-Q4 to 2012-Q4). Control variables 
include market determinants of the changes in sovereign CDS spreads (i.e., the changes in the iTraxx index, in 
the stock market total return index, in overall volatility, in the term spread, and in the EUR effective exchange 
rate) and bank sector controls (i.e., capital ratio, deposit ratio, funding fragility, income diversity, liquidity, and 
bank sector concentration). The FE models additionally control for week fixed effects and/or country-quarter 
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the country*quarter-level are reported in parentheses. Significance 
levels are indicated by *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.     
 
Panel A: Foreign sovereign exposures of non-GIIPS countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model OLS OLS FE FE 
Dep. variable Log CDS
LogCDS Index x Sovereign 
Subsidy/GDP
7.023*** 7.049*** 7.119*** 7.410*** 
 
(1.960) (2.000) (2.041) (2.081) 
LogCDS Index 0.722*** 0.709*** 0.620*** 0.613*** 
 
(0.081) (0.093) (0.095) (0.096) 
Sovereign Subsidy/GDP -0.068* -0.015 -0.010 
 
  (0.035) (0.057) (0.063)   
Controls NO YES YES YES 
Constant YES YES YES YES 
Week FE NO NO YES YES 
Country-Quarter FE NO NO NO YES 
Observations 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 
Clustering country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter 
R2 (adj.) 0.732 0.732 0.732 0.732 
 
 
Panel B: Foreign sovereign exposures of GIIPS countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model OLS OLS FE FE 
Dep. variable Log CDS
LogCDS Index x Sovereign 
Subsidy/GDP
1.204 2.397 7.014 7.917 
 
(9.610) (11.052) (9.635) (9.982) 
LogCDS Index 0.918*** 0.731*** 0.680*** 0.669*** 
 
(0.145) (0.177) (0.146) (0.151) 
Sovereign Subsidy/GDP 0.270 0.294 0.209 
 
  (0.297) (0.278) (0.255)   
Controls NO YES YES YES 
Constant YES YES YES YES 
Week FE NO NO YES YES 
Country-Quarter FE NO NO NO YES 
Observations 1,134 1,134 1,134 1,134 
Clustering country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter 
R2 (adj.) 0.625 0.642 0.67 0.669 
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Table 4: Bank-level data 
This table reports the results from regressions of changes in individual bank CDSs on changes in a European sovereign CDS index, the sovereign subsidy with EAD fixed (i.e., 
risk-weighted exposures of each bank toward non-domestic EU sovereigns that are fixed at their values at the beginning of the observation period using exposure data from the 
EBA), and the interaction between these two variables using the EBA data at the bank level. Columns (1) to (4) show results for the full sample, columns (5) and (6) for the 
subsample of non-GIIPS banks and columns (7) and (8) for the subsample of GIIPS banks. All models include bank, week and country-quarter fixed effects and interactions of 
bank fixed effects with the change in the CDS market index (iTraxx) and the change in the volatility index (VSTOXX). CDS spread changes are computed on a daily level, 
covering ± 30 days around the exposure reporting date (December 2009, December 2010, October 2011, December 2011, and June 2012) and the sovereign CDS index is 
weighted by the fixed non-domestic sovereign exposures of a country's financial system. Columns (3) to (8) additionally control for the change in the domestic sovereign CDS 
spread. Standard errors clustered at the bank-level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
Sample Full sample non-GIIPS banks GIIPS banks 
Dep. variable Log Bank CDS
LogCDS Index x Sovereign Subsidy/Total 
assets
4.984** 4.476** 4.874*** 4.351** 5.464*** 4.410** -0.786 -0.790 
 
(2.068) (1.998) (1.760) (1.693) (1.613) (1.617) (1.756) (1.868) 
LogCDS Index 0.091*** 0.096*** 0.032 0.037 0.136*** 0.147*** 0.001 0.003 
 
(0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.021) (0.018) 
Sovereign Subsidy/Total assets -0.084 -0.084 -0.086 -0.086 -0.122 -0.122 0.127 0.060 
 
(0.083) (0.078) (0.082) (0.076) (0.083) (0.079) (0.189) (0.179) 
LogCDS Domestic
  
0.097*** 0.109*** 0.033* 0.046*** 0.131*** 0.162*** 
      (0.024) (0.022) (0.017) (0.016) (0.031) (0.030) 
Bank-level betas on market return and volatility YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Week FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Country-Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 7,673 7,673 7,673 7,673 4,926 4,926 2,747 2,747 
Clustering bank bank bank bank bank bank bank bank 
R2 (adj.) 0.395 0.436 0.400 0.442 0.428 0.464 0.366 0.432 
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Table 5: Understanding Risk Weights 
This table reports the results of regressions of changes in individual sovereign CDS spreads on changes in a 
European sovereign CDS index and its interaction with the sovereign subsidy (i.e., risk-weighted exposures of 
the domestic financial sector toward non-domestic EU sovereigns) using different risk weights.All regressions 
use BIS data on non-GIIPS banks’ foreign sovereign exposures. In all models, CDS spread changes are 
computed on a daily level, covering ± 30 days around the exposure reporting date (end of quarter 2010-Q4 to 
2012-Q4). Column (1) uses EBA risk weights to calculate the sovereign subsidy for those countries that are 
below the -3% budget deficit criterion of the Maastricht treaty, and risk weights of zero for countries fulfilling 
the Maastricht criterion. Column (2) calculates risk weights as in the baseline specifications in Table 2 but uses 
an LGD of 17%. Column (3) calculates the sovereign subsidy by risk-weighting the exposures of the domestic 
banking sector toward non-domestic EU sovereigns by CDS implied probabilities of default. Column (4) 
calculates the sovereign subsidy using the EAD (i.e., non-risk-weighted exposures of the domestic financial 
sector toward non-domestic EU sovereigns). Column (5) applies EBA risk weights as in the baseline 
specifications in Table 2 but uses the EAD (i.e., the non-risk-weighted exposures of the domestic financial sector 
toward non-domestic EU sovereigns) fixed at the beginning of the observation period. Control variables include 
market determinants of the changes in sovereign CDS spreads (i.e., the changes in the iTraxx index, in the stock 
market total return index, in overall volatility, in the term spread, and in the EUR effective exchange rate). All 
regressions control for week and country-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the country*quarter-
level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. variable ∆Log CDS  
  
Risk weights 
depending on 
budget deficit 
Risk weights 
with LGD of 
17% 
CDS implied 
risk weights 
EAD 
Sovereign 
exposure fixed at 
beginning of 
observation period 
LogCDS Index x Sovereign 
Subsidy/GDP 
11.059*** 12.754*** 4.120** 
 
6.764*** 
 
(2.886) (3.292) (1.570) 
 
(1.554) 
LogCDS Index x EAD/GDP 
   
-0.049 
 
    
(1.044) 
 
LogCDS Index 0.568*** 0.635*** 0.631*** 0.865*** 0.488*** 
  (0.087) (0.090) (0.117) (0.118) (0.065) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,512 1,512 1,344 1,512 1,512 
Clustering country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter 
R2 (adj.) 0.733 0.733 0.746 0.724 0.705 
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Table 6: Other potential channels 
This table reports results from taking other potential transmission channels into account using the BIS data on 
non-GIIPS banks’ foreign sovereign exposures. Column (1) reports results from a regression of changes in 
individual sovereign CDSs on changes in a European sovereign CDS index and its interaction with the sovereign 
subsidy (i.e., risk-weighted exposures of the domestic financial sector toward non-domestic EU sovereigns) 
accounting for unobserved common factors with heterogeneous factor loadings by applying the Pesaran CCE 
estimator. Standard errors are bootstrapped. Column (2) drops France and Germany, the two economically most 
integrated countries in the EU, from the estimation sample. The model in column (3) controls for alternative 
explanations for the impact of non-domestic sovereign CDS changes on sovereign CDS by including the ECB 
capital share (i.e., bailout responsibility for other eurozone sovereigns) and the ratio of government debt to GDP 
(i.e., bailout capacity). Columns (4) and (5) focus on the non-sovereign subsidy (i.e., risk-weighted exposures of 
the domestic financial sector toward non-domestic EU non-sovereigns such as banks, firms and households) and 
its interaction with changes in a European sovereign CDS index. In all models, the sovereign CDS index is 
weighted by the non-domestic sovereign exposures of a country's financial system. CDS changes are computed 
on a daily level, covering ± 30 days around the exposure reporting date (end of quarter 2010-Q4 to 2012-Q4). 
Control variables include market determinants of the changes in sovereign CDS spreads (i.e., the changes in the 
iTraxx index, in the stock market total return index, in overall volatility, in the term spread, and in the EUR 
effective exchange rate). All regressions control for week and country-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors 
clustered at the country*quarter-level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<.01, 
** p<.05, * p<.1. 
 
 
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6) 
Model CCE FE FE FE FE 
Dep. variable Log CDS
Channel 
Common 
shocks 
Without 
France and 
Germany 
 Direct 
Transfers 
Non-Sovereign  
Exposures 
LogCDS Index x Sovereign 
Subsidy/GDP
6.613*** 10.252*** 14.397*** 
 
5.354** 
 
(1.970) (1.949) (3.575) 
 
(2.414) 
LogCDS Index x ECB Share
  
0.880*** 
  
   
(0.197) 
  
LogCDS Index x Debt Ratio
  
-0.630 
  
   
(0.410) 
  
LogCDS Index x Non-Sovereign 
Quasi-Subsidy/GDP    
2.827*** 1.522* 
    
(0.848) (0.820) 
LogCDS Index 0.667*** 0.388*** 0.904*** 0.467*** 0.467*** 
  (0.083) (0.093) (0.328) (0.143) (0.139) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES 
Avg.LogCDS YES NO NO NO NO 
Avg. Sovereign Subsidy/GDP YES NO NO NO NO 
Week FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-Quarter FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,512 756 1,512 1,512 1,512 
Clustering country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter 
R2 (adj.) 0.753 0.748 0.741 0.730 0.733 
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Table 7: Falsification tests (non-EU sovereigns) 
This table reports the results from falsification tests using exposures to non-EU sovereigns not falling under the 
zero risk weight regulation from the BIS data on non-GIIPS banks’ foreign sovereign exposures during times of 
large sovereign CDS spread increases. The exposure to these non-EU sovereigns is used to compute a quasi-
sovereign subsidy. In all models, CDS spread changes are computed on a daily level, covering +/-30 days around 
the exposure reporting date. Columns (1) and (2) report regressions of changes in individual sovereign CDS on 
changes in the US sovereign CDS, the US quasi-sovereign subsidy (i.e., risk weighted exposures of the domestic 
banking sector toward the US sovereign), and the interaction between these two variables in 2011-Q1 and 2011-
Q2. Columns (3) and (4)  report regressions of changes in individual sovereign CDS on changes in the Japanes 
sovereign CDS, the Japanes quasi-sovereign subsidy (i.e., risk weighted exposures of the domestic banking 
sector toward the Japanese sovereign), and the interaction between these two variables in 2011-Q2 to 2011-Q4. 
Control variables include market determinants of the changes in sovereign CDS spreads (i.e., the changes in the 
iTraxx index, in the stock market total return index, in overall volatility, in the term spread, and in the EUR 
effective exchange rate). The FE models additionally control for week and country-quarter fixed effects. 
Standard errors clustered at the country*quarter-level are reported in parentheses, significance levels are 
indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
Dep. variable Log CDS
Falsification US exposure Japanese exposure 
LogUS CDS x US Quasi-Sovereign Subsidy/GDP -12.674 -10.777 
  
 
(12.096) (6.800) 
  
LogJapanese CDS x Japanese Quasi-Sovereign 
Subsidy/GDP   
-5.028 -4.307 
   
(20.145) (14.892) 
Log US CDS 0.804*** 0.257** 
  
 
(0.163) (0.084) 
  
Log Japanese CDS
  
0.361*** 0.067 
   
(0.079) (0.061) 
US Quasi-Sovereign Subsidy/GDP -0.055 
   
 
(0.152) 
   
Japanese Quasi-Sovereign Subsidy/GDP 
  
-0.037 
 
      (0.783)   
Controls NO YES NO YES 
Constant YES YES YES YES 
Week FE NO YES NO YES 
Country-Quarter FE NO YES NO YES 
Observations 332 332 472 472 
Clustering country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter 
R2 (adj.) 0.312 0.692 0.060 0.642 
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Table 8: Sovereign risk spillovers and bank capitalization 
This table reports the results of tests using the BIS data and controlling for potential risk mitigation measures by 
banks. All columns report regressions of changes in individual sovereign CDS on changes in a European 
sovereign CDS index, the sovereign subsidy (i.e., risk-weighted exposures of the domestic banking sector toward 
non-domestic EU sovereigns), and the interaction between these two variables. The sovereign CDS index is 
weighted by the non-domestic sovereign exposures of a country's financial system. CDS spread changes are 
computed on a daily level, covering ± 30 days around the exposure reporting date (end of quarter 2010-Q4 to 
2012-Q4).  In addition, columns (1) and (2) contain interactions with the average risk-weighted asset coverage 
ratio of European sovereign bond exposures by country and columns (3) and (4) interactions with the average 
bank capital ratio by country and period. Control variables include market determinants of the changes in 
sovereign CDS spreads (i.e., the changes in the iTraxx index, in the stock market total return index, in overall 
volatility, in the term spread, and in the EUR effective exchange rate). The FE models additionally control for 
week and country-quarter fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels 
are indicated by *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. 
 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model OLS FE OLS FE 
Dep. variable Log CDS
LogCDS Index x Sovereign Subsidy/GDP 22.313*** 22.180*** 13.167*** 12.756*** 
 
(5.315) (5.306) (4.269) (4.298) 
LogCDS Index 0.567*** 0.418*** 0.528*** 0.400*** 

(0.127) (0.127) (0.142) (0.144) 
Sovereign Subsidy/GDP 0.179 
 
-0.087 
 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.097) 
 
RWA Coverage x LogCDS Index x Sovereign Subsidy/GDP -8.837*** -8.806*** 
  
 
(2.549) (2.551) 
  
RWA Coverage x LogCDS Index 0.136** 0.144** 
  
 
(0.064) (0.063) 
  
RWA Coverage x Sovereign Subsidy/GDP -0.105 
   
 
(0.065) 
   
RWA Coverage 0.002 
   
 
(0.002) 
   
Capital Ratio x LogCDS Index x Sovereign Subsidy/GDP 
  
-1.563** -1.482** 
   
(0.748) (0.756) 
Capital Ratio x CDS Index 
  
0.053** 0.051** 
   
(0.023) (0.023) 
Capital Ratio x Sovereign Subsidy/GDP 
  
0.012 
 
   
(0.016) 
 
Capital Ratio 
  
-0.000 
 
      (0.001)   
Controls NO YES NO YES 
Constant YES YES YES YES 
Week FE NO YES NO YES 
Country-Quarter FE NO YES NO YES 
Observations 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646 
R2 (adj.) 0.685 0.688 0.684 0.687 
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Table 9: The September 2011 capital exercise 
This table reports the results from a regression of changes in individual sovereign CDS on changes in a European sovereign CDS index, the sovereign subsidy (i.e., risk-weighted 
exposures of the domestic banking sector toward non-domestic EU sovereigns), and the interaction between these two variables using the BIS data on non-GIIPS banks’ foreign 
sovereign exposure. The sovereign CDS index is weighted by the non-domestic sovereign exposures of a country's financial system. CDS changes are computed on a daily level, 
covering ±30 days around the exposure reporting date (end of quarter 2010-Q4 to 2012-Q4). Column (1) displays the results for the before-CE period up to 2011-Q3. Column (2) 
shows results for the after-CE period starting from 2011-Q4, while column (3) focuses on the after-CE period starting from 2012-Q1 and column (4) on the after-CE period 
starting from 2012-Q2 (when the new sovereign buffer actually became required in June 2012). Control variables include market determinants of the changes in sovereign CDS 
spreads (i.e., the changes in the iTraxx index, in the stock market total return index, in overall volatility, in the term spread, and in the EUR effective exchange rate) and bank 
sector controls (i.e., capital ratio, deposit ratio, funding fragility, income diversity, liquidity, and bank sector concentration). The models in columns (5) to (8) display the results 
from the before- and after CE regressions controlling for week and country-quarter fixed effects. Control variables include market determinants of the changes in sovereign CDS 
spreads (i.e., the changes in the iTraxx index, in the stock market total return index, in overall volatility, in the term spread, and in the EUR effective exchange rate). Standard 
errors clustered at the country*quarter-level are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS FE FE FE FE 
Dep. variable  Log CDS
Sample Before CE 
After CE 
(starting 2011-
Q4) 
After CE 
(starting 2012-
Q1) 
After CE 
(starting 2012-
Q2) 
Before CE 
After CE 
(starting 2011-
Q4) 
After CE 
(starting 2012-
Q1) 
After CE 
(starting 2012-
Q2) 
LogCDS Index x Sovereign 
Subsidy/GDP
7.646*** 3.628 -2.448 -1.284 7.839*** 4.612 -1.441 1.219 
 
(2.077) (5.556) (5.875) (7.529) (2.302) (5.991) (6.492) (8.595) 
LogCDS Index 0.695*** 0.836*** 1.024*** 0.992*** 0.597*** 0.696*** 0.868*** 0.804** 
 
(0.090) (0.203) (0.218) (0.273) (0.110) (0.232) (0.265) (0.337) 
Sovereign Subsidy/GDP -0.064 -0.107 -0.128 -0.216 
    
  (0.037) (0.086) (0.115) (0.161)         
Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Week FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Country-Quarter FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Observations 672 840 672 504 672 840 672 504 
Clustering country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter 
R2 (adj.) 0.771 0.683 0.666 0.664 0.767 0.688 0.676 0.677 
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Appendix 1: Variable definitions 
This table reports variable definitions and data sources. The sources are: Bloomberg (BB), Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), Thomson Reuters Datastream (DS), European Banking Authority (EBA), European Central 
Bank (ECB), Eurostat (EUSt) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Quarterly National 
Accounts (OECD), and SNL Financial (SNL). 
   Variable Source Definition 
Sovereign CDS BB Five-year CDS spreads of a European sovereign (in bps) 
Log CDS BB Daily changes in five-year CDS spreads of a European sovereign 
Sovereign bond yield BB Yields of 10 year bonds issued by a European sovereign (in bps) 
Log bond yield BB Daily returns of 10 year bonds issued by a European sovereign 
LogCDS index BB, BIS 
Daily returns of an index covering five-year CDS spreads of European 
sovereigns weighted by the non-domestic exposures of a country's financial 
system 
Bond index BB, BIS 
Daily returns of an index covering 10 year bond yields of European 
sovereigns weighted by the non-domestic exposures of a country's financial 
system 
Bank  exposure  to  
non- domestic 
sovereigns 
BIS Exposures of the domestic financial sector to non-domestic EU sovereigns 
Sovereign subsidy (EBA 
risk weights) 
BIS, 
EBA 
Exposures of the domestic financial sector to non-domestic EU sovereigns, 
risk weighted by ratings-implied risk weights suggested by the European 
Banking Authority's stress test methodology 
Sovereign subsidy (CDS 
implied risk weights) 
BB, BIS 
Exposures of the domestic financial sector to non-domestic EU sovereigns, 
risk weighted by weights implied by sovereign CDS spreads 
GDP OECD Gross domestic product of individual European countries 
RWA coverage EBA 
Ratio of risk weighted assets for EU sovereign exposure to total EU 
sovereign exposure of country level financial sector 
ECB capital share ECB 
Share of a country's national central bank in the subscribed capital of the 
ECB (also translates to the share in the subscribed capital and the callable 
capital of the European Stability Mechanism) 
Government debt ratio EUSt General government consolidated gross debt to GDP 
iTraxx DS 
Daily changes in the index covering CDS spreads of the 125 most liquid 
CDSs referencing European investment grade credits (continuous series) 
DS equity index DS Daily changes in the total return index for the European stock market 
VSTOXX DS 
Daily changes in the index measuring volatility in the European stock 
market (referencing the EURO STOXX 50) 
EONIA DS 
Daily changes in the effective overnight interest rate for the euro interbank 
market (euro overnight index average) 
Euribor (12 months) DS 
Daily changes in the effective 12-month interest rate for the euro interbank 
market (euro interbank offered rate) 
Term spread DS 
Daily changes in the difference between 12-month interest rate (12-month 
Euribor) and the overnight interest rate (EONIA) 
EUR exchange rate ECB 
Nominal effective exchange rate, Euro area-18 countries vis-à-vis the EER-
20 group of trading partners (AU, CA, DK, HK, JP, NO, SG, KR, SE, CH, 
GB, US, BG, CZ, LT, HU, PL, RO, HR and CN) against the euro 
Capital ratio SNL Ratio of equity to total assets of country level financial sector 
Deposit ratio SNL Ratio of deposits to total assets of country level financial sector 
Funding fragility SNL Ratio of net loans to deposits of country level financial sector 
Income diversity SNL 
Ratio of net interest income to total operating income of country level 
financial sector 
Liquidity SNL 
Ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets of country level financial 
sector 
Concentration SNL 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index, sum of the squared market shares of all 
available banks, computed on the country level using total assets 
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Appendix 1. Examples for Spillovers 
 
Cyprus is a recent example of sovereign risk spillovers in Europe. Figure 1 shows the 
development of the Greek sovereign debt rating by Moody’s, the sovereign CDS spread of 
Cyprus, and the risk-weighted Greek sovereign debt exposure of Cypriot banks. These 
exposures reflect the risk-weighted assets Cypriot banks needed to fund with equity if zero risk 
weight regulation did not apply. The figure strikingly shows how Cyprus’ CDS spread increased 
as Cypriot banks’ risk-weighted exposure increased from 36% to 73% of the country’s GDP 
between January 2011 and January 2012. We show these spillovers are pervasive across the 
Eurozone.1 
 
Figure 1: The Case of Cyprus 
This figure presents an overview of the development of the Greek sovereign debt rating and the sovereign CDS 
spread of Cyprus over recent years. It also displays the Greek sovereign debt exposures of the two largest banks 
in Cyprus, Bank of Cyprus and Marfin Popular Bank, which these banks had to report as part of the EBA stress 
tests. The exposures are weighted by a ratings-implied risk weight suggested by the EBA and set into relation to 
the GDP of Cyprus. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1 Another quintessential example includes Dexia. Dexia required (a second) government support due to its 
sovereign exposures in 2011, not because the exposures were so big but because it had very little equity due to the 
zero weight exemption (Admati and Hellwig, 2013). 
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Appendix 2. Sovereign subsidy 
 
Appendix 2 - Table 1: Country-level sovereign exposure and sovereign subsidy 
This table reports the total non-domestic EU sovereign exposure of those EU countries' financial sectors for which 
comprehensive data on cross-border bank exposure are available in the consolidated banking statistics of the BIS 
for the year-end of 2010, 2011, and 2012. In addition, it shows the relation of these exposures to GDP and reports 
the total amount of the sovereign subsidy, a risk-weighted asset equivalent of the non-domestic sovereign 
exposures of the respective financial sectors (using EBA risk weights) and the sovereign subsidy as a share of 
GDP. Panel A displays total financial sector exposures and subsidies to all non-domestic EU sovereigns, while 
Panels B and C report financial sector exposures and subsidies to non-domestic peripheral EU sovereigns (Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) and other (non-peripheral) EU sovereigns, respectively.    
    
Panel A: Total banking sector non-domestic exposure to all EU sovereigns 
Country 
Total non-domestic EU sovereign exposure 
in EUR mn (in % of GDP) 
Non-domestic  EU sovereign subsidy (risk-
weighted) in EUR mn (in % of GDP) 
 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 
Banks in peripheral countries     
Ireland 6,550 10,778 10,890 1,266 1,814 1,764 
 4.9% 7.6% 7.3% 0.9% 1.3% 1.2% 
Italy 63,307 68,103 80,122 16,729 16,623 20,231 
 4.5% 4.6% 5.4% 1.2% 1.1% 1.4% 
Spain 52,220 48,892 74,115 11,193 16,364 21,990 
 4.8% 4.4% 6.6% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 
Banks in other countries     
Belgium 47,817 34,091 32,431 17,854 14,379 11,875 
 15.7% 10.7% 9.8% 5.8% 4.5% 3.6% 
France 227,701 182,334 210,061 57,555 63,756 74,947 
 13.8% 10.6% 11.7% 3.5% 3.7% 4.2% 
Germany 137,515 125,915 133,905 42,263 54,341 59,798 
 6.0% 5.2% 5.3% 1.9% 2.3% 2.4% 
U.K. 130,200 221,267 245,096 25,664 42,333 43,950 
  7.9% 13.3% 14.2% 1.6% 2.5% 2.5% 
 
Panel B: Total banking sector non-domestic exposure to peripheral EU sovereigns 
Country 
Total non-domestic EU sovereign exposure 
in EUR mn (in % of GDP) 
Non-domestic  EU sovereign subsidy (risk-
weighted) in EUR mn (in % of GDP) 
 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 
Banks in peripheral countries     
Ireland 1,528 352 277 453 259 204 
 1.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 
Italy 6,535 5,739 4,715 3,004 3,269 3,914 
 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 
Spain 13,619 11,899 12,140 5,453 9,544 11,582 
 1.3% 1.1% 1.1% 0.5% 0.9% 1.0% 
Banks in other countries     
Belgium 18,585 9,475 5,875 6,320 6,160 4,229 
 6.1% 3.0% 1.8% 2.1% 1.9% 1.3% 
France 113,806 69,791 71,709 39,169 44,424 51,993 
 6.9% 4.1% 4.0% 2.4% 2.6% 2.9% 
Germany 77,395 61,619 56,705 29,208 40,360 43,765 
 3.4% 2.6% 2.3% 1.3% 1.7% 1.7% 
U.K. 22,890 15,145 11,076 9,052 11,453 9,051 
  1.4% 0.9% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.5% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
Panel C: Total banking sector non-domestic exposure to other (non-peripheral) EU sovereigns 
Country 
Total non-domestic EU sovereign exposure 
in EUR mn (in % of GDP) 
Non-domestic  EU sovereign subsidy (risk-
weighted) in EUR mn (in % of GDP) 
 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 
Banks in peripheral countries     
Ireland 5,022 10,426 10,613 814 1,555 1,561 
 3.8% 7.3% 7.1% 0.6% 1.1% 1.0% 
Italy 56,772 62,364 75,407 13,725 13,354 16,317 
 4.0% 4.2% 5.0% 1.0% 0.9% 1.1% 
Spain 38,601 36,993 61,976 5,741 6,820 10,408 
 3.6% 3.4% 5.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.9% 
Banks in other countries     
Belgium 29,232 24,616 26,556 11,534 8,220 7,646 
 9.6% 7.7% 8.0% 3.8% 2.6% 2.3% 
France 113,895 112,543 138,352 18,386 19,332 22,954 
 6.9% 6.5% 7.7% 1.1% 1.1% 1.3% 
Germany 60,120 64,297 77,200 13,054 13,981 16,034 
 2.6% 2.7% 3.1% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 
U.K. 107,310 206,122 234,020 16,611 30,880 34,900 
 6.5% 12.4% 13.6% 1.0% 1.9% 2.0% 
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Appendix 3. Calculating risk-weights 
 
We follow the standard formula and assumptions of the Foundation Internal Ratings Based (F-
IRB) approach of the Basel Committee in computing appropriate risk weights (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005). The IRB approach calibrates the risk weights to a 
99.9 percent VAR model essentially using four risk components, namely probability of default 
(PD), loss given default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD), and effective maturity (M), for each 
given exposure. Because we use the F-IRB approach, the PD is the only risk component that is 
estimated in a separate model, either following the EBA assumption on PDs or computing CDS 
implied PDs. For the remaining risk components, we follow standard assumptions setting the 
LGD to 45 percent (F-IRB LGD for senior unsecured exposures), the EAD to the actual 
exposure, and the effective maturity M to 2.5 years. The derivation of risk-weighted assets then 
follows from the application of the standard IRB formula using these risk components as inputs 
in computing the capital requirement (K) for each exposure. K is computed as 
 
𝐾 = [𝐿𝐺𝐷 ∗ 𝑁 [(1 − 𝑅)−0.5 ∗ 𝐺(𝑃𝐷) + (
𝑅
1 − 𝑅
)
−0.5
∗ 𝐺(0.999)] − 𝑃𝐷 ∗ 𝐿𝐺𝐷]
∗ (1 − 1.15 ∗ 𝑏)−1 ∗ [1 + (𝑀 − 2.5) ∗ 𝑏] 
 
 
with N and G being the standard normal distribution and its inverse, respectively, and the 
correlation (R) and maturity adjustment (b) being computed as 
 
 
𝑅 = 0.12 ∗
1 − exp(−50 ∗ 𝑃𝐷)
1 − exp(−50)
+ 0.24 ∗ [1 −
1 − exp(−50 ∗ 𝑃𝐷)
1 − exp(−50)
] 
 
 
and 
 
 
𝑏 = (0.11852 − 0.05478 ∗ ln(𝑃𝐷))2 
 
 
The capital requirement (K) is expressed as a percentage of the exposure. To derive risk 
weights and risk-weighted assets, it must be multiplied by the reciprocal of the minimum 
capital ratio of 8 percent and, finally, by the EAD. 
 
𝑅𝑊 = 12.5 ∗ 𝐾 
 
 
and 
 
 
𝑅𝑊𝐴 = 𝑅𝑊 ∗ 𝐸𝐴𝐷 
 
 
Appendix 3 Table 1 provides an overview of the resulting risk weights. Appendix 3 Table 2 
shows alternative risk weights. 
 
 
 6 
Appendix 3 – Table 1. Ratings, risk weights and the computation of the sovereign subsidy 
This table reports risk weights which are consistent with EBA stress test assumptions on probability of defaults 
(PDs) for rating classes and standard assumptions on loss given default (LGD) (45%) and maturity (2.5 years) and 
computed according to the Basel F-IRB approach as described in Appendix 2. These risk weights are used to 
weight non-domestic EU sovereign exposures when computing the sovereign subsidy (i.e., risk-weighted assets 
not reflected in regulatory capital requirements).  
      
S&P rating Moody's rating Fitch rating EBA PD 
Adequate 
risk weight 
AAA Aaa AAA 0.03% 0.144 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 0.03% 0.144 
AA Aa2 AA 0.03% 0.144 
AA- Aa3 AA- 0.03% 0.144 
A+ A1 A+ 0.26% 0.505 
A A2 A 0.26% 0.505 
A- A3 A- 0.26% 0.505 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 0.64% 0.776 
BBB Baa2 BBB 0.64% 0.776 
BBB- Baa3 BBB- 0.64% 0.776 
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 2.67% 1.244 
BB Ba2 BB 2.67% 1.244 
BB- Ba3 BB- 2.67% 1.244 
B+ B1 B+ 9.71% 1.91 
B B2 B 9.71% 1.91 
B- B3 B- 9.71% 1.91 
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 36.15% 2.451 
CCC Caa2 CCC 36.15% 2.451 
CCC- Caa3 CCC- 36.15% 2.451 
CC Ca CC 36.15% 2.451 
C C C 36.15% 2.451 
D C D 100.00% 2.451 
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Appendix 3 – Table 2. Alternative risk weights 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
EBA risk 
weights 
(baseline) 
Risk 
weights 
depending 
on budget 
deficit 
Risk 
weights 
with 
LGD of 
17% 
CDS 
implied 
risk 
weights 
EAD 
Sovereign 
exposure 
fixed at 
beginning 
of 
observation 
period 
Austria 0.144 0.016 0.055 0.363 0 0.144 
Belgium 0.144 0.144 0.055 0.563 0 0.144 
Bulgaria 0.776 0.086 0.293 0.942 0 0.776 
Cyprus 0.906 0.906 0.342 2.184 0 0.906 
Czech Republic 0.438 0.227 0.166 0.486 0 0.438 
Denmark 0.144 0.064 0.055 0.295 0 0.144 
Estonia 0.438 0 0.166 0.492 0 0.438 
Finland 0.144 0 0.055 0.234 0 0.144 
France 0.144 0.144 0.055 0.412 0 0.144 
Germany 0.144 0.016 0.055 0.273 0 0.144 
Greece 2.147 2.147 0.811 2.406 0 2.147 
Hungary 0.915 0.431 0.346 1.171 0 0.915 
Ireland 0.859 0.859 0.324 1.455 0 0.859 
Italy 0.468 0.468 0.177 0.845 0 0.468 
Latvia 0.914 0.535 0.345 0.930 0 0.914 
Lithuania 0.776 0.776 0.293 0.918 0 0.776 
Netherlands 0.144 0.144 0.055 0.294 0 0.144 
Poland 0.505 0.505 0.191 0.614 0 0.505 
Portugal 0.950 0.950 0.359 1.603 0 0.950 
Romania 0.984 0.984 0.372 1.027 0 0.984 
Slovakia 0.505 0.505 0.191 0.588 0 0.505 
Slovenia 0.325 0.325 0.123 0.711 0 0.325 
Spain  0.395 0.395 0.149 0.883 0 0.395 
Sweden 0.144 0 0.055 0.210 0 0.144 
UK 0.144 0.144 0.055 0.274 0 0.144 
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Appendix 4. Robustness Tests 
 
Appendix 4 – Table 1. Robustness Tests 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. variable ∆Log Bond Yield ∆Log CDS  
Robustness 
Alternative 
dependent 
variable 
Quadratic CDS 
Index 
 Financial Sector 
Health 
EBA data 
LogBond Index x Sovereign 
Subsidy/GDP
22.700***       
 (7.145)    
LogCDS Index x Sovereign 
Subsidy/GDP 
4.083** 8.886*** 3.054** 
 
 (1.831) (2.558) (1.297) 
LogCDS Index quadratic x Sovereign 
Subsidy/GDP 
2.366   
 
 (17.381) 
  
LogBond Index  -0.115    
 -0.199    
LogCDS Index  0.708*** -1.892** 0.711*** 
 
 (0.069) (0.774) (0.062) 
LogCDS Index quadratic  -0.033 
  
    (0.549)     
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Constant YES YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES YES 
Country-Quarter FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,347 2,646 2,646 3,592 
Clustering country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter country*quarter 
R2 (adj.) 0.125 0.686 0.699 0.522 
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Appendix 5. Summary statistics EBA data 
 
 
 
Appendix 5 – Table 1.  Summary statistics EBA data  
This table reports the summary statistics for the main variables for the EBA data aggregated at the country level. 
Appendix 1 provides variable descriptions and information on the data sources. 
 
Variable Unit Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. N 
Dependent variable       
∆Log CDS percent -0.01 3.94 -30.85 45.39 3,592 
Explanatory variables       
∆CDS index (ind. weights) percent -0.04 3.31 -15.73 9.82 3,760 
Bank exposure to non-domestic 
sovereigns/GDP 
percent 7.77 8.71 0 39.9 3,969 
Sovereign subsidy (EBA risk weights)/GDP percent 4.1 10.71 0 69.55 3,969 
Government debt ratio percent 77.54 28.6 30.2 150.21 3,969 
Controls       
iTraxx index pts 140.58 43.55 65.3 207.96 3,969 
DS equity index index pts 1322.84 125.25 1129.06 1554.75 3,969 
VSTOXX index pts 29.2 8.16 18.36 53.55 3,969 
EONIA bps 52.84 28.9 11.1 146.3 3,969 
Euribor (12 months) bps 158.25 37.42 95.6 212.9 3,969 
Term spread bps 105.41 23.58 43.3 156.6 3,969 
EUR exchange rate ratio 102.29 4.92 94.45 113.52 3,969 
GDP mn EUR 604,845 690,916 5,651 2,630,331 3,969 
Capital ratio percent 6.48 2.65 2.55 14.29 3,845 
Deposit ratio percent 47.08 17.4 12.5 83.65 3,845 
Funding fragility percent 117.18 51.07 0 271.89 3,845 
Income diversity percent 62.73 43.14 -292.86 184.71 3,763 
Liquidity ratio percent 15.34 8.44 2.92 64.96 3,845 
Concentration percent 29.87 25.26 6.03 100.00 3,845 
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Appendix 6. Exposure to individual countries 
 
Holdings of foreign bonds might also be more prevalent in larger countries, which could 
increase the connection between foreign sovereign bond holdings and the co-movement of 
domestic sovereign CDS and the European CDS index. Large countries have a larger weight in 
the overall CDS index than smaller countries as they also issue more debt themselves. Instead 
of using a European sovereign CDS index, we include the sovereign subsidy associated with 
individual GIIPS exposures (scaled with the country’s GDP) both individually and as 
interaction terms with the change of the respective country CDS spread (e.g. ΔLogCDS Spain 
in case of exposure to Spanish sovereign debt). The results are reported in Appendix 4. 
Consistent with our earlier results, we find a larger co-movement of sovereign CDS spreads if 
banks have larger sovereign subsidies.2 
  
                                                 
2 The interaction term is insignificant in the subsample, in which we evaluate spillovers from exposures to Spanish 
sovereign debt. A possible reason is the size of the sovereign subsidy which is about one-fourth of the subsidy of 
banks towards Italy. 
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Appendix 6 – Table 1. Country-specific exposures of non-GIIPS countries 
This table reports the results from regressions of changes in individual sovereign CDS spreads on specific sovereign subsidies related to exposures to single GIIPS countries 
interacted with changes in the respective sovereign CDS spread. The regressions use BIS data on the non-GIIPS countries. CDS changes are computed on a daily level, covering ± 
30 days around the exposure reporting date (end of quarter 2010-Q4 to 2012-Q4). Control variables include market determinants of the changes in sovereign CDS spreads (i.e., the 
changes in the iTraxx index, in the stock market total return index, in overall volatility, in the term spread, and in the EUR effective exchange rate). The FE models additionally 
control for week and country-quarter fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Model OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
Dep. variable Log CDS
Country Spain Italy Ireland Greece Portugal 
LogCDS Country x Country 
Sovereign Subsidy/GDP
14.321 16.333 15.006*** 15.272*** 444.862*** 117.439* 33.073*** 9.836 69.091** 65.490*** 
 (16.812) (13.169) (3.673) (3.044) (93.132) (70.102) (10.961) (6.590) (30.076) (21.477) 
LogCDS Country 0.530*** 0.288*** 0.424*** 0.185*** 0.057 0.070 -0.009 -0.030 0.303*** 0.059 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.034) (0.032) (0.097) (0.071) (0.057) (0.034) (0.055) (0.039) 
Country Sovereign Subsidy/GDP -0.778  -0.089  1.838  0.636  -0.275  
 (0.497)  (0.120)  (2.340)  (0.516)  (0.857)  
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Week FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Country-Quarter FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 840 840 1,512 1,512 
R2 (adj.) 0.487 0.632 0.510 0.637 0.251 0.588 0.109 0.604 0.206 0.593            
 
 
 
